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Abstract—In this paper, we present a mathematical model
for the mutation of social groups. Group mutability has been
studied in multiple domains, with insights generated on signifi-
cant factors at differing scales. Mathematical modeling enables
the simultaneous study of such phenomena, understanding
interactions and generating hypotheses for experiments. In
particular, we focus on group fracture, where individuals leave
groups of which they are members. For example, this can
be due to perceived differences with other group members
due to norm related conflict (such as extreme actions by some
members). Our aim is to consider simple mathematical models
incorporating a selection of social and psychological theory
which describes these phenomena as a way to understand their
interplay, and describe the trade-offs and challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
The existence, persistence, and stability of groups is an
emerging topic of study in differing contexts (see [1] for a
summary). Key problems in the field include the evolution
of costly cooperation [2], [3] and the persistence of groups,
even in the face of (possibly negative) externalities [4]. The
effect of norms as factors that internalize externalities and
affect decision-making has been mathematically formalized
by Coleman [5], albeit for rather simple settings. Further-
more, the importance of an individual’s identity and the re-
sulting knock-on effects on their decision-making have been
studied in the economic and social psychology literature [6].
The integration of the effects of these different phenomena
on group behavior and dynamics, across individual to group
scales, will help generate testable hypotheses for real-world
settings and provide actionable insights into the drivers of
group actions.
Theoretical studies on group behavior have either directly
focused on simple two-player ultimatum and prisoner’s di-
lemma games [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], or bespoke
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games relevant to particular scenarios (e.g., group conflict
[14], [15], [16]). Recently, Kranton [17] provided a roadmap
for the integration of more complex models to create an
identity-based meta-model for group behavior. We examine
this modeling approach, as well as the social psychology-
inspired factors that should be considered in such models
that aim to examine group stability in an earlier work
[18]. In this paper, we integrate micro-economic models
that have been developed to describe group persistence-
relevant phenomena to develop a mathematical theory of
group fracture and stability.
Quantifying the stability of a group and relating it to the
motivations and perceptions of individuals and the norms of
the group help us to identify stable groups and their most
vulnerable/reluctant group members, and serve as a basis
for reasoning about the interactions of the aforementioned
phenomena. We categorize group persistence-related phe-
nomena based on their social dependence: interdependent
phenomena are dependent on the choices and actions of
other group members, while independent phenomena are
related to the psychology and perception of the individual
irrespective of other group members.
In [18], we explicitly describe how norms and information
externalities (e.g., through social comparison [19]) are some
such inter-dependent phenomena, while identity [6]1/self-
categorization [20] and individual characteristics/ability are
some such independent phenomena.
A. Research Question
In particular, we focus on the effect of norm-related
conflict and informational externalities in the fracture of
a group. For example, this can capture the case where
empirical expectations of individuals conflict with normative
expectations, leading to the supremacy of empirical expec-
tations and the changing of normative expectations [21].
Conflicts can also manifest when a specific social norm
puts a significant strain on a particular individual (conflicting
with a fairness norm), or when the burden it places on an
individual is significant enough to convince them to leave
the group (and to risk the associated negative consequences).
Finally, the cost of group membership is not always explicit:
decision-making can be affected by the information gleaned
by an individual (e.g., through signaling [1] or through
1In [6], identity also depends on the actions of others (and in our parlance
would be considered inter-dependent). In this paper, we use “identity” to
only represent the independent part of the individual’s utility, capturing the
effect of others’ actions on an individual’s decision-making through our
model of “externalities”.
observational learning [22], [23], [24]). We seek to quantify
insights about the relationship of these factors to the stability
of social groups and to provide testable hypotheses and
actionable predictions about the fracture of social groups.
B. Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new mathematical model that
captures the tensions between individuals and the groups to
which they belong and how this influences the stability or
fracture of the group. This paper elucidates the high-level
linkage between mathematical theory and social phenomena
through which group stability can be assessed by way of
representations of utility. We formally quantify a group-
member’s relative attachment to the group, which can be
used to predict the least satisfied members of a group and
thus the most likely to leave. This is especially important
to characterize for internally-stable extremist groups, where
tactically targeting particular individuals with incentives
to leave the group (e.g., monetary incentives, information
campaigns) so as to create division within their structure,
and where such knowledge can remove the need for costly
and dangerous tactical missions.
It should be noted that while we borrow liberally from the
underlying assumptions of many of the works we integrate
(as will be stated), our modeling approach is distinct,
especially, from the game-theory literature which considers
repeated interactions modeled as simple games. Our focus is
on the inter-play of many different phenomena at different
scales. Such a meta-model of group stability will, for the first
time, allow the simultaneous exploitation of diverse insights
from social psychology, sociology, and economics, as well
as facilitating the understanding of their interplay.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In this work, we develop models for individual utili-
ties that incorporate the group-based phenomena described
above. These utilities will have three broad parts:
1) Intrinsic/Personal: A simple cost-benefit calculation
that determines the effort the individual expends in group-
related activities. The calculation of actions is complicated
by the diverse abilities and aptitudes of individuals.
2) Externalities: The actions chosen by other group mem-
bers affect the perceptions of the individual and their choice
of effort/action. This externality modifies the utility of an
individual as well as possibly changing their chosen action.
This is complicated by the limited observations of other
group members and the difficulty in inferring the reason
behind their actions.
3) Group-based effects: While the previous two parts of
the utility are related to individual interactions, there are
group-based effects that manifest on longer time-scales, e.g.
a psychological utility due to attachment to groups (related
to the salience of the group), and a representative utility re-
lated to norm-based interactions with other group members,2
2This is related to the social exchange theory-posited view of social
interactions [25].
which may decrease the utility of a single individual to the
benefit of other group members. More precisely, this latter
utility models normative expectations by the individual.
These utilities form a special case of the identity-based
utility proposed by Akerlof and Kranton [6], where the
utility of an individual j in a group is modeled as:
Uj = Uj(aj ,a−j , Ij(aj ,a−j ; cj , j ,P)),
where aj represents the actions chosen by individual j, a−j
represents the actions chosen by others, and Ij is person
j’s identity/self-image, which other than actions, depends
on the assigned social categories cj and the match between
the individual’s characteristics j and the group ideals P. In
our parlance, the terms with aj and j would represent in-
trinsic utility, the terms with a−j would primarily represent
externalities, while the cj-dependent terms would represent
group-based effects.
To capture the mapping of different scales of group-
relevant phenomena into these outlined types of utility, we
break our analysis into the three broad categories outlined
by Kranton [17], which are dubbed the short, medium, and
long run. In her framework, individuals choose actions in
the short run taking expectations, norms, identities, and
categories to be fixed. In the medium run, individuals can
take some actions to modify their empirical and normative
expectations (to resolve conflict) or their relative attachment
to groups (categorization). In the long run, nothing is fixed.
In the short run, we identify social comparison [19]
as one of the externality-causing phenomena and use the
mathematical framework set up by Clark and Oswald [26]
to capture its effect on decision-making.3 Social comparison
is a mechanism through which individuals compare their
opinions and actions with others to gain a better and pos-
sibly accurate self-evaluation [19]. This internal mechanism
both affects individual decision-making and, indirectly, the
decision-making of others [26], [27], [28]. Accordingly, the
aggregation of information about others is hypothesized to
affect the utility, and thus the decision-making, of individu-
als in the short-run.
We also incorporate possible differences in abilities
among individuals. Social comparison among intrinsically
similar individuals may lead to the straightforward adoption
of successful behavior [29]. However, with heterogeneity in
abilities, observing the actions of others is not necessarily
informative of their effort (i.e., their strategy). Thus, the
effect of social comparison is a comparison of observable
actions/behaviors, or rewards, with other group members.
One of the interesting results of the framework in [26] is
that it has been shown to implicitly model both convention-
following and contrarian characteristics in individuals.
In the medium run, we consider empirical and normative
expectations [21] and group norms [30], and identity [31],
[32] and their effect on group members.
3Nothing in our analysis of the medium and long-run prevents the
incorporation of other phenomena in the short-run model.
Normative expectations act as a belief about expected
behavior of the individual, while empirical expectations
act as an expectation of future behavior by others. When
they are in conflict, the conditional preference property
of group norms may make an individual less likely to
follow them, adopting the empirical norms instead. From
the theoretic perspective, norms are considered to act as
correlating devices of a correlated equilibrium [33]. We
aggregate norm-based interactions/exchanges among group-
members (alternately, consider the correlated equilibrium
that is played) to see their effect on individuals in the
medium-run.4 A complicating factor for norm-based con-
sideration may also possibly be present in the medium-
run: individuals are inclined to reject unfair norms (inequity
aversion) in some instances [35].
In the medium-run, we also quantify how important the
group is to an individual’s self-concept5 (i.e., their self-
categorization), as well as their perception of the threats they
perceive from the group as possible punishments for norm
deviation. The effects, though different in origin, manifest as
a group friction/stickiness in aggregate: they measure how
relatively willing an individual is to suffer onerous norms
in the group.
The questions investigated in this time horizon are whet-
her a norm is self-consistent (e.g., will empirical expectati-
ons match normative expectations) and whether it is unfair
[35]. If the answer to any of these questions is no, then one
can predict that the normative expectations will evolve in
the long-run to resolve these conflicts (in other words, the
description of the norm is not stable). This view of norms
and their evolution is inspired by Bicchieri [21].
The primary question under investigation in the long run
is whether a given group is stable under the evolved (and
thus self-consistent) normative expectations of the medium-
run. For the purpose of this study, we define stability to
mean that no member of the group would be incentivized to
leave the group. We use the model of rational agents with
clear preferences used in economics in this definition. If it
is indeed stable, and no member will disassociate with the
group of their own volition, it is instructive to understand
which member is the most vulnerable group member to
target with an incentive to facilitate their leaving of the
group.
After making the case for a model for group stability
that considers social comparison and group norms, in the
next subsections we describe the constituent parts of the
mathematical model and its underpinnings from an analytic
perspective.
A. Short Run
We now present the additive social comparison model
courtesy of Clark and Oswald [26] for the short run. In
this model, individuals choose how much effort to put into
4This is also to account for so-called generalized exchange [34], where
reciprocity in interactions is not direct in every exchange, and happens at
the population level over many interactions
5Equivalent to Akerlof and Kranton [6]’s cj .
an action (that is related to the purpose of the group) given
their ability in that task, which is a personal, unobservable,
and heterogeneous trait, as well as a subjective social com-
parison. In this model, an individual’s private ability/fitness
to perform tasks related to that goal is captured by their
type θ ∈ [θ, θ]. We assume this parameter does not change
in the time-scale of consideration. An individual considers
their type in choosing their effort which leads to their
(observable) action a ≥ 0. Thus, there is a trade-off for
each individual, between the rewards related to taking an
action, and the cost of the effort it requires. This internal
trade-off is further complicated by the psychological effects
of social comparison.
In this setting, an individual’s short-term utility function
is:
w(θ, a) := (1− s)u(a)− c(a, θ) + sv(a− a∗),
where:
• u(a) is the benefit of observable action a ≥ 0 to
an individual.6 In this model, outcomes are related to
actions and not to (private) abilities. This term can, for
example, model the likelihood of success of the action.
• c(·, ·) is the ability-dependent cost of effort, and for
each type θ is an increasing convex function of action a.
For a constant a, and given that θ represents ability, the
function is decreasing in θ (i.e., more capable people
can achieve the same outcome with less effort).
• v(·) is the subjective effect of comparison with some
measure (e.g., mean) of other group-member actions
has on the individual. Clark and Oswald [26] focus
on the case where individuals gain satisfaction from
surpassing the actions of others (so downward com-
parison has a positive effect and upward comparison
has a positive effect), but the framework can easily be
extended to consider the opposite case.
• a∗ is what the individual perceives to be the repre-
sentative “group action”. We assume, in line with
the original model, that this representative action is
the population mean action. This variable couples the
actions of individuals in the short-run and is the source
of information-related externalities.
• s ∈ [0, 1] is a variable that tunes the relative importance
of the objective and subjective (comparative) utilities
to the decision-maker. If s is set to 1, the utility has
no comparative element, and the model devolves into
a classical economic model with objective costs and
benefits.
Clark and Oswald show that in this model, if v(·) is
concave, an increase in a∗ will lead to an increase in the
action a chosen by the individual, while if it is concave, the
individual will decrease their effort (and thus their action)
in response to an increase in a∗. Thus, this model implicitly
captures behavioral types of individuals (conventional vs
contrarian) in addition to capturing ability types.
6For simplicity, we assume scalar actions. The approach can easily be
extended to encapsulate vectors of actions.
In these settings, the individual’s problem to find their
best action is:
y(θ) := arg max
a≥0
(1− s)u(a)− c(a, θ) + sv(a− a∗).
The utility that an individual derives from comparison
against their reference group depends on a characterization
of the group’s actions, e.g. via the mean observed action a∗.
To estimate this value accurately, individuals must accumu-
late information. Therefore, this representative action may
not always align with the true population mean. However,
as an individual encounters more and more people, the
empirical mean observed action will converge to the mean of
the distribution. If f(θ) is the probability density function
of individuals across types in terms of their ability, then
a∗ = Eθ{y(θ)} =
∫ θ
θ
y(θ)df(θ). Thus, the short-run utility
usr(θ) of each individual is:
usr(θ) :=(1− s)u(y(θ))− c(y(θ), θ)
+ sv(y(θ)− Eθ{y(θ)}). (1)
In this time-frame, group norms and identities can be
assumed to be fixed.
B. Medium run
In the medium run, we focus on group effects. We assume
that the short run dynamics have reached an equilibrium,
such that the perception of a∗ by group members has
converged to the real population average, and individuals
receive a utility of usr(θ) from the short-run dynamics.
The group has a salience to an individual that is captured
through a parameter γ ∈ [γ, γ]. This parameter can also
model how important a group is to a person’s self-concept,
or, inversely, how difficult a group is to leave (i.e., what
adverse consequences or punishments would result from
such an action). In effect, this acts as a “friction” term that
keeps group members inside the group. For example, for a
minimal group, γ would be small, while it would be large
for a group that is especially important to an individual’s
self-concept. We assume that this parameter is fixed in the
short and medium run. Thus, we can assume that there
is a probability density function f(θ, γ) over the set of
(θ, γ) pairs which describes the population. Note that this
allows there to be a possible correlation between ability and
salience of the group to the individual.
Each individual, knowing their private ability and the
salience of the group to them, takes the action they believe
other group members expect someone in their situation to
take (normative expectations). We quantify the preferences
of the individuals over these norm-related actions through
a function, bn(θ, γ), that considers the net effect of these
actions on the individual. Positive bn(θ, γ) denotes the case
where the individual expects to derive additional utility from
norm-based interactions with other group members, while
negative bn(θ, γ) denotes the case where the individual
expects to have to contribute to other group members (i.e.,
take on a burden) due to the norm. For example, some norms
may involve some group members helping other in-group
members. In these circumstances, adhering to normative
expectations may not just place no burden on the individual
being helped, they might also decrease the effort they need
to exert in completing the task. On the other hand, the
additional burden on the helpers/donors may make group
membership less desirable to them.
Note that we assume the individual has knowledge about
the whole function of bn(·, ·) (i.e., normative expectations
of group members), but acts only according to what the
function specifies for someone with their attributes.
Each individual will also have expectations about norm-
related behavior from other group-members. These expecta-
tions will be empirical [21], and will align with their obser-
ved behavior. We quantify the preference of an individual
over these empirical actions through the function be(θ, γ),
which signifies the understanding of the individual about the
actions taken by other group members given their private
information (translated to the same scale as bn(θ, γ)).
There may arise a case where an individual’s empirical
expectations conflict with their normative ones. This will
be the case when the behavior they observe from others
is incompatible with the behavior they deem the others
expect from them. Under these conditions, the normative
expectation will be amended over time to be compatible
with the empirical expectation [21]. Since we are not
explicitly concerned with the process under which these
changes happen,7 we consider the end-result, where we
have a convergence of bn and be to a compatible functional
description of the norm, b(θ, γ).8 This would be the shared
norm that is enforced by the group in the medium run,
possibly through sanctions [36]. While there is significant
work in understanding sanctioning decisions and their effect
on norms, we do not consider them explicitly in this
framework.9
For this norm to be self-compatible, it must be possible
for each individual in the group to perform the action
which they believe the norm prescribes for them, and for
other group members to be able to sustain the expectations
of an individual. In norms governing resources that are
concrete (having the same value to individuals performing
and receiving the action) and non-particularistic (with value
that is irrespective of the identities of the actors), e.g.,
money and goods, as defined in Foa’s resource theory of
social exchange [37], this condition results in the following
necessary condition for a self-sustaining norm:10
7i.e., convergence to a correlated equilibrium.
8This may require the pre-supposition that individuals know the correct
distribution of f(θ, γ), as θ and γ are private variables. Understanding the
informational conditions that are necessary for this convergence is beyond
the scope of this paper.
9In the long-run, we discuss the fact that leaving the group would result in
the loss of the benefit gained from group membership (codified in our model
through γ). This loss can capture the effect of ostracism and sanctions for
not abiding by norms.
10Equation (2) may apply in a more complex way for norms governing
resources that do not fall within these categories.
∫ θ
θ
∫ γ
γ
b(θ, γ)f(θ, γ)dγdθ ≤ 0. (2)
One could also add other constraints on to the group norm
that align with psychological and social constraints. For
example, it has been argued that a complementary measure
of fairness of a norm is required to capture effects such as
inequity aversion [38]. One could, in principle, include other
mathematical constraints on the set of norms under conside-
ration in to capture such observations. One such constraint
could penalize norms that place large expectations, or even
give large benefits, to a subset of people [39].∫ θ
θ
∫ γ
γ
(
b(θ, γ)
)w
f(θ, γ)dγdθ ≤ F, (3)
where F is a fixed upper-bound and w > 1 is a parameter
that represents how sensitive the fairness constraint is to pla-
cing higher burdens on individuals, with higher w indicating
more concern for the fairness of the norm. One can also
formulate versions of (3) that account for fairness within
specific subgroups of the social group.
Putting norm-related and group-identity related factors to-
gether, the medium-run utility umr(θ, γ) of each individual
is:
umr(θ, γ) := γ + b(θ, γ). (4)
C. Long run
In the medium run, we assumed that individuals have
“learned” the norms of the group (e.g., perceived norms of
group members and collective norms have converged). In the
long-run, given that even the group itself is not considered
fixed, we focus on the stability of the group. In particular,
we discuss each individual’s choice of whether to remain
in the group and to be bound by its norms, or to leave the
group and risk sanctions by group members. The preference
is codified through a comparison of the individual’s utility
within the group and outside the group11.
Leaving the group would also modify the expected short-
run and medium-run utility of the individual, as in the short-
run, outside the group, the individual will be deprived of
the feedback provided by observing the actions of group-
members. This would translate to a change in an individual’s
utility function, and therefore their chosen action.
yo(θ) := arg max
a≥0
u(a)− c(a, θ).
Thus, the expected short-run utility of an individual outside
the group can be calculated from:
uosr(θ) := u(y
o(θ))− c(yo(θ), θ)). (5)
11This approach is similar to the “comparison level for alternative” in
social exchange theory (defined by Thibaut and Kelley [40]), which is
technically “the lowest level of relational rewards a person is willing to
accept given available rewards from alternative relationships or being alone”
[41].
The medium-run effects we described are both related to
group membership, and will have no effect once the indivi-
dual leaves the group12.
1) Long run group stability with no fairness norms:
Individuals make the decision to leave the group or to
stay by considering their preference over these choices, as
captured by a comparison of total in-group utility with that
they could expect to sustain outside the group in the short
and medium run:
umr(θ, γ) + usr(θ) ≥ uomr(θ, γ) + uosr(θ), (6)
where usr(θ) and umr(θ, γ) (respectively uosr(θ) and
uomr(θ, γ)) are an individual’s expected short-run and
medium-run utility inside (outside) the group. The difference
between the two sides of the inequality represents the
starkness of the difference between the choices for (θ, γ)-
individuals. One can think of this difference as represen-
ting the additional encouragement (in the form of outside
incentives) the individual would need to be convinced to
leave the group. For example, this can capture the rewards
offered to members of terrorist groups to facilitate their de-
radicalization [42]).
Without loss of generality, henceforth we will only consi-
der a finite number of (θ, γ) pairs and a related probability
mass function P (θ, γ) so as to have cleaner definitions.
We now provide a mathematical definition for long-run
stability S of a group: S is the minimum additional incentive
that has to be offered to group members to cause one of them
to leave in the long run:
S := min k (7)
s.t. umr(θ, γ) + usr(θ)− uomr(θ, γ)− uosr(θ) ≤ k ∃θ,γ .
Notice that if (6) does not hold for an individual in the group,
then by default S < 0. This means that such an individual
will leave the group of their own volition and thus the group
is unstable. In these cases, one can use this framework to
study how many individuals would have to leave the group
to make it stable, potentially via computational simulations.
Also note that (7) is equivalent to:
S = max k (8)
s.t. umr(θ, γ) + usr(θ)− uomr(θ, γ)− uosr(θ) ≥ k ∀θ,γ .
This is useful because the constraints of the maximum for-
mulation fit the typical constrained optimization framework.
III. STABILITY-MAXIMIZING NORMS
In the long run, we seek to study what type of shared
norms maximize the stability of a groups. In this study, we
are not investigating how these norms are generated nor
the exact mechanisms by which they are maintained, but
only on their effect on the mutability of the group. Note
that characterizing stability-maximizing norms allows the
quantification of the most stable group that can exist with
12This is due to the way we have encoded γ. One can equally plausibly
define γ to emphasize the relative dis-utility of being in the out-group.
any possible norm, and allows the design of interventions
that would be successful without knowledge of the specific
norm. We start with the case that is not constrained by (3):
arg max
b(·,·)
S(θ, γ) (9)
s.t.
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
b(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) ≤ 0.
Thus, the problem of identifying the most stable type
of group norm is equivalent to finding a solution to the
following problem:
arg max
b(·,·)
max
k≥0
k (10)
s.t. b(θ, γ) ≥ uosr(θ)− usr(θ)− γ + k
∀θ,γP (θ, γ) > 0,
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
b(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) ≤ 0.
For simplicity, we define ∆(θ) := −uosr(θ) +usr(θ), which
is the short-run utility difference of group membership. Note
that (10) becomes:
arg max
b(·,·)
max
k≥0
k (11)
s.t. b(θ, γ)− k ≥ −∆(θ)− γ ∀θ,γP (θ, γ) > 0,
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
b(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) ≤ 0.
We now explicitly show the closed-form solution for the
most stable norm b∗(θ, γ) and most stable group S∗(θ, γ).
Theorem 1. For the inequity-unconstrained case, and for
all (θ, γ) such that P (θ, γ) > 0:
b∗(θ, γ) = −(γ − Eγ{γ})− (∆(θ)− Eθ{∆(θ)}).
Furthermore:
S∗(θ, γ) = Eθ{∆(θ)}+ Eγ{γ}
This means that the most stable norm asks of each
individual to contribute to the group in direct proportion
to the relative salience of the group to the individual and
the relative positive informational externalities they gain
by virtue of group membership. Interestingly, this is easily
compatible with real-world cases where norms persist even
though they impose more onerous tasks on less capable
individuals, as stability is related to relative informational
externalities and not to innate ability.
This theorem also implies that in the inequity-
unconstrained case, any outside offer of above Eθ{∆(θ)}+
Eγ{γ} (i.e., the mean informational externalities of group
membership plus mean salience of the group to its mem-
bers) for members to leave the group will be successful
irrespective of the particular norm of the group.13
13i.e., which correlated equilibrium is being played.
Finally, this helps show how conditions under which
individuals suffer negative short-run group-membership ex-
ternalities (e.g., through social comparison) from group
membership affect the stability of a group, and why an
individual may choose to remain within the group under
such conditions: 1) high salience of the group to the in-
dividual, 2) threats of punishment for leaving the group,
and 3) compensation from other group members through
the prevalent social norms.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the theorem by putting together the results
of two observations, both proved in the appendix. Assume
b∗(·, ·) and k∗ are the optimal solutions to (11). We first
define R := {(θ, γ) ∈ [θ, θ]∗[γ, γ]|b∗(θ, γ)−k∗ = −∆(θ)−
γ}, the set of all (θ, γ) pairs for which the individual group
membership inequality constraint holds with equality for the
optimal solution.
Observation 1. P{R} = 1.
Thus, we have for all (θ, γ) such that P (θ, γ) > 0:
b∗(θ, γ)− k∗ = −∆(θ)− γ. (12)
We also show that the self-sustaining inequality is tight for
the most stable norm:
Observation 2.
∑θ
θ=θ
∑γ
γ=γ b
∗(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) = 0.
Replacing (12) into the statement of Observation 2, we
have:
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
b∗(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) =
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
(k∗ −∆(θ)− γ)P (θ, γ)
= k∗ − Eθ{∆(θ)} − Eγ{γ} = 0.
Therefore, k∗ = Eθ{∆(θ)} + Eγ{γ}, and so for all such
(θ, γ), b∗(θ, γ) = −(γ − Eγ{γ})− (∆(θ)− Eθ{∆(θ)}).
IV. CONCLUSIONS, CHALLENGES, AND NEXT STEPS
In this paper, we provide a novel mathematical model for
social group stability that quantifies the relative strength of
a group by measuring the motivation of its most vulnerable
member. We show that the most stable group norms are
those that place burdens on individuals in accordance with
the relative salience of the group to the individual (as
compared to their peers) and the relative benefit they gain
from informational externalities provided by the group. We
also show that these informational externalities need not be
in alignment with the abilities of group members, leading to
seemingly paradoxical cases where stable norms ask more
of less able group members.
The insights derived from the framework presented, which
are gleaned from integrating models at different scales, are
difficult to hypothesize in experimental settings due to the
complexity of the interactions among the numerous social
and psychological processes. Understanding the interplay
between these processes mathematically allows us to posit
hypotheses about such complex interactions that can be
amenable to experimentation.
In future work, we will seek to understand the effects
of inequity aversion on the stability of norms, as well
as explicitly characterizing the effects of contrarian and
conformist behavior types on group stability. Analyzing the
process by which unstable groups can stabilize by shedding
members is another interesting question for study.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Observation 1
Proof: By contradiction. Assume 0 < P (R) < 1. This
means14 that there exists (θ1, γ1) such that P (θ1, γ1) =
 > 0 and b∗(θ1, γ1) − k∗ + ∆(θ1) + γ1 = ω >
0. Now, consider the norm b′(·, ·) where b′(θ, γ) =
b∗(θ, γ) + ωm(1−) for (θ, γ) 6= (θ1, γ1) such that P (θ, γ) >
0, b′(θ1, γ1) = b∗(θ1, γ1) − ωm , and where m =
min{(θ,γ):P (θ,γ)>0} P (θ, γ). In this case,
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
b′(θ, γ)P (θ, γ)
: =
∑
(θ,γ)6=(θ1,γ1)
b′(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) + b′(θ1, γ1)P (θ1, γ1)
=
∑
(θ,γ)6=(θ1,γ1)
(
b∗(θ, γ) +
ωm
(1− )
)
P (θ, γ)
+
(
b∗(θ1, γ1)− ωm

)
P (θ1, γ1)
=
θ∑
θ=θ
γ∑
γ=γ
b∗(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) ≤ 0,
so b′(·, ·) fulfills (2) (is a self-sustaining norm). Furthermore,
this new norm satisfies the constraints in (8) (stated for
k∗) with strict inequalities for all (θ, γ) that have positive
probability (as ω − ωm = ω( −ω ) > 0). Therefore, there
exists a real value δ > 0 such that the equalities will also
hold with strict inequality for k∗ + δ > k∗, which is in
contradiction with the optimality of k∗.
B. Proof of Observation 2
Proof: By contradiction.
Assume
∑θ
θ=θ
∑γ
γ=γ b
∗(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) = −τ < 0. As in
the proof of Observation 1, we define a secondary norm that
for each (θ, γ) such that P (θ, γ), b′′(θ, γ) := b∗(θ, γ) +
τ
P (θ,γ) . In this case,
∑θ
θ=θ
∑γ
γ=γ b
′′(θ, γ)P (θ, γ) = 0 (the
new norm fulfills (2)). Furthermore, this new norm satisfies
the constraints in (8), stated for k∗ + τM > k
∗, where
M := max(θ,γ) P (θ, γ), which is a contradiction with the
optimality of k∗.
14Given that we are have a discrete, finite-valued distribution.
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